



ARF Chairman's role, to establish a system of self-reporting, etc.²⁷ If we consider that CBMs are at the early stage of application in this region, and that CSCE/OSCE began to conceive PD only in the middle of 1990s, it is very possible that the ideas are to be realized in this region only in the distant future. The reports mentions that "[I]f the ARF is to live up to its potential, it must be prepared to take on a preventive diplomatic role eventually."²⁸

Second, if we read the 'local' definition of PD, it is clear that PD in this region is only an institutional overstretch.²⁹ As the actors of PD, four different identities are specified. Non-governmental actors can play an important role in the security arena only when globalization is advanced to a considerable level and the concept of comprehensive security replaces the traditional definition of security. That is, security governance should be a major theme of regional security. However, this concept began to be applied to Europe in the most recent years.³⁰

Third, the definition already recognizes the obstacles in the reality of East Asian international relations. It specifies the condition that ARF takes the role of PD: through the invitation or voluntary consent. This sentence assumes that China is involved in many flash points in the region and China was not willing to accept any external interference. ARF is not able to overcome the power politics of the region.

Fourth, these efforts to upgrade the organizational function of ARF is led by and confined to CSCAP, which do not take any official responsibility. It tells that it is very probable that the discussions may stop short of practical application.

Efforts at the institutional level would be necessary for the organization's future. However, ambitious institutional goals, which are not supported by success factors of other levels, may result in the disappointment of the organization's potential and may face political head wind. It is more important to enrich the substance of regional cooperation than to enlarge the institutional contours.

BILATERAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES: A SOLUTION FOR THE MULTILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN EAST ASIA

This is the time to find an answer to overcome this impasse and achieve multilateral institution for security cooperation. From the analysis of European experience, we can tell that mere existence of institution was a critical factor to convert the momentum of structural changes into concrete measures of security cooperation and CBMs. At once we accept this generalization, we can recognize the importance of existing multilateral cooperative bodies, whether they are advanced or not, in its institutional arrangement. Rather than trying to imitate the institutional contours of OSCE without learning process of the member countries and without appropriate contextual environment, we would better wait for the moment of structural change which would bring about the chance for quantum leap in institutional development, while concentrating our effort for political changes that may facilitate multilateral agreement on regional cooperative security.

The author proposes the establishment of bilateral CBMs between the neighboring countries. This approach carries several features. First, this effort starts from the political

²⁷ Ralph A. Cossa, 'Promoting Preventive Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific Region', in CSCAP CSBM International Working Group Report, *Preventive Diplomacy: Charting a Course for the ASEAN Regional Forum*, (Hawaii: Pacific Forum CSIS, 2002), pp. 1-26.

²⁸ CSCAP CSBM International Working Group Report, *Preventive Diplomacy*, p.1

²⁹ Cossa presents the definition of PD in the CSCAP Working Group Report. "Non-coercive actions take, by individuals, governments, multilateral organizations, and/or international agencies, and through the invitation or voluntary consent of all parties directly involved, to prevent disputes from arising between or among parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread or recurrence of the latter if they occur." *Ibid.*, p. 1.

³⁰ See Elke Krahmann, 'Conceptualising Security Governance', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 38: 1, (2003). (forthcoming)



initiative of a single country and the start-up cost is very low. Compared to the time and labor spent to reach an agreement and to execute the decision in the multilateral framework, agreement between two countries can be realized more practically and efficiently. Second, contrary to bilateralism based on security alliance, which assumes defense against threat and the exclusion of non-member states, this bilateral approach is inclusive. Beginning of CBMs is prospective of the full-scale confidence between the two, and believes in the possibility of transition from enmity to amity. The utility of bilateral CBMs increases exponentially as the participant increases arithmetically. Third, when the bilateral confidence propagates and forms a web of confident relationship, eventually it will contribute to the development of multilateral security cooperation.

Existing studies focusing on the CBMs between Korea and Japan employ the measures to illustrate the improved cooperation of the "virtual alliance".³¹ In the Post-Cold War environment, Japan has been expanding its security role, though confined to rear-area support for the U.S. forces in operation, under the agreement between U.S. and Japan.³² In this context, the U.S. has been encouraging Korea, another one of its alliance partner, to be actively involved in military cooperation. In this context, the confidence building efforts were viewed as a preparation to overcome the antagonism and to proceed to security cooperation equivalent to alliance.

(Table 1, 2, and 3, about here)

Now, take a step back and look at the big picture of the Far Eastern area. The inclusiveness and diffusiveness of bilateral CBMs will be supported by the comparisons of the bilateral CBMs among China, Japan and Korea. Tables 1, 2, and 3 show each of the bilateral CBMs. According to the categorization of CBMs by Pederson and Weeks,³³ all of the measures adopted between these countries were confined to transparency measures. From these tables, we can find that the surge in the number of exchanges and kinds of measures did not occur only for Korea-Japan dyad. It is a rather common phenomenon across the three dyads, though with some difference in degree. Exchanges of military personnel increased significantly at the turn of the century in all three tables. Port calls are realized in two dyads and it is only delayed in the China-Japan dyad. Each dyad has institutionalized annual meetings at the ministerial level and working levels since 1995. Comparing these three tables, we can expect that the importance measures, such as installation of hot lines and joint search and rescue exercise that is adopted only between Japan and Korea, will be adopted in the other two dyads in the near future. In this study, our concern on bilateral CBMs is limited to the three countries, but if we include Russia, the tendency of inclusiveness and diffusiveness will become more conspicuous.

CONCLUSION

From the European experience, we can choose three factors that were inevitable for the success of multilateral security cooperation and CBMs: (1) structural changes exogenous to the region, (2) political efforts by the member countries, and (3) existence of institution. Applying this formula to the East Asian situation, we reached this conclusion: as long as an

³¹ Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States - Korea - Japan Security Triangle*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

³² See Mike M. Mochizuki, *Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations*. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997).

³³ Pederson and Weeks, 'A Survey of Confidence and Security Building Measures'.



institutional framework (e.g., ARF) exists, we should focus our effort on priming the political willingness to pursue peaceful resolution of conflict and ignore the structural obstacles, which is beyond our capability. We have to wait for the chance given from the changes in structure to make dramatic improvement in the institution to arrive.

Among the obstacles listed in existing studies, lack of experience of major wars during the last 50 years, lack of serious threat perception, various territorial disputes, antagonism from history, non-existence of neutralist country, and unilateralism of the Bush administration are the structural factors that are out of the region's control. Efforts to fix these obstacles are futile and wasteful. As long as these are necessary conditions for regional cooperation, efforts to imitate institutional arrangements of OSCE will not be effective. On the other hand, factors such as lack of leadership, cultural factors such as consensus on non-interference and preference of unofficial decision-making, lack of commonality and antagonism from history can be improved by political willingness. As a method to nurture the political environment for multilateral security cooperation, the installation of bilateral CBMs has been proposed.

Bilateralism pursuing cooperative security is different from bilateralism based on realist perspective of security. It is inclusive rather than exclusive, and diffusive rather than concentrate. It requires a certain amount of political willingness at least as much as to start CBMs, reversing the existing suspicion and antagonism. Once initiated, it will proceed under the principle of comprehensive reciprocity. If each country become a hub of bilateral CBMs, this whole region will be covered by a web of CBMs. Then, the region will be ready to make its own political changes for multilateral institutions, and it will be ready to respond to any structural changes in the form of multilateral security cooperation.



Table 1. Korea-Japan CBMs³⁴

• Information Measures (High-Level Military Personnel Exchange)

Year	Visiting Japan	Visiting Korea
1992		• Chief of JDA
1994	• Annual Meeting at Ministerial Level and Annual Working Level Talks are institutionalized.	
1998	• Minister of Defense	• Chief of Staff GSDF
	• Annual bilateral security talks started.	
1999		
2000	• Chief of Staff GSDF • Assistant Administrative Minister of JDA	• Chief of Naval Operation
2001	• Director of Personnel and Education Bureau, JDA. • Director, Chief of Staff GSDF • Director, Chief of Staff ASDF	• ROK 2 nd Brigade Commander

• Communication Measures:

- 1) Consultation over "Air Defense Intercept Zone" (agreed on expansion of the area) (1990)
- 2) Installation of three hot lines (1999): linking the Korean Ministry of Defense with JDA, the ROK Air Combat Command with the ASDF, and the ROK Naval Operations Command with MSDF.

• Information Measures in General:

- 1) Exchange of training programs between ROK Navy and MSDF.
- 2) Exchange of Port Calls: Korean Naval Vessels to Japan (1994), Japanese Naval Vessels to Korea (1996).
- 3) Summit meeting(1998) agreed to expand the mutual visits of the defense ministers and the exchanges at other levels, and to step up military exchanges such as mutual visits of warships. Torrents of military-to-military contacts followed.
- 4) Company-grade officers (GSDF personnel) visited Korea (1999). They practiced on-the-spot training and toured major South Korean army posts.
- 5) Meeting for Intelligence Exchange (2000).
- 6) Working-Level Meeting for Security and Defense Policy (2000).
- 7) High-level and training group of GSDF visited Korea.(2002)
- 8) Korean Naval Academy, Cruise Operation Unit visited Japan (2002).
- 9) Working-level Meeting for Air Defense (2002).
- 10) ROK Army low-level training group visited Japan.(2002).
- 11) Working-Level Meeting for Security and Defense Policy (2001).

• Observation/Inspection Measures: Joint search and rescue exercise by the ROK navy and MSDF in the open sea off the Cheju island.

³⁴ This table is reconstructed based upon these resources. Elliot C. S. Kang and Yoshinori Kaseda, 'Korea and the Dynamics of Japan's Post-Cold War Security Policy', *World Affairs* 164:2, (Fall, 2001), pp. 51-59. Japan Defense Agency. *Defense of Japan 2002 White Paper*. <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/pab/ojdp02/english.htm> (Searched on Feb 13, 2003).



Table 2. Korea-China CBMs ³⁵

• **Information Measures (High-Level Military Personnel Exchange)**

Year	Visiting China	Visiting Korea
1992	• Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff	
1994	• Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff • Director of Intelligence Headquarter*	
1995	• Policy Section Chief*	
1996	• Director of Intelligence Headquarter* • The 1 st Assistant Vice Minister of Defense	• PLA Director of Foreign Affairs Bureau*
1997	• Policy Assistant Vice Minister * • Vice Minister	
1998	• Director of the Policy Planning Bureau*	• Vice Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff
1999	• Minister of Defense • Director of Intelligence Headquarter* • Director of the Policy Planning Bureau*	
2000	• Chief of Naval Operations • Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff	• Chi Haotian, Minister of Defense • Vice President of Defense University
2001	• Chief of Army • Director of Intelligence Headquarter* • Minister of Defense	Chief of Air Force
2002	• Chief of Air Force • President of Defense University	President of Defense University

* Working-level Exchanges

• **Communication Measures (Academic exchanges):** Korea-China Defense Conference hosted by KIDA and CISS. Held annually since 1996.

• **Information Measures (Exchange of Port Calls):** Korean Naval Vessels to Shanghai, China (Oct. 2001), Chinese Naval Vessels to Incheon, Korea (May 2002)

• **Observation/Inspection Measures:** Student Officers of Korea Defense University (1994, 1996, 1997, 1999-2001), Korean Military Academy (1996-2001), Korean Naval Academy (1998-2001), Air Force Academy (2000).

³⁵ Reconstructed from Taeho Kim, 'Han-Joong Gunsu Gyoryu Hyubryuk: Hanguokui Poyonglinga, Joonggookui Teuckhyeinga?', paper presented at Chinese Politics Study Group in 2002.



Table 3. Japan-China CBMs³⁶

• **Information Measures (High-Level Military Personnel Exchange)**

Year	Visiting China	Visiting Japan
1986		• Chief of General Staff
1987	• Director of JDA (the 1 st visit)	
1993	•	
1995	• Chairman of Joint Staff Council	
1996	• Administrative Vice Director of JDA	
1998	• Director of JDA	• Chi Haotian Chinese Defense Minister
2000	• Chairman of Joint Staff Council • Chief of Staff ASDF	• PLA Chief of General Staff • PLA Vice Chief of General Staff
2001		• Chief of Chinese Air Force

• **Information Measures :**

- 1) Establishment of Regular Security Dialogue (Bureau Chief Level) (1993); Suspended after U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration of 1996. The 6th Meeting was held in 1999.
- 2) Exchange of Ministers (1998): Discussed on mutual visits of navy warships; joint training of the PLA and JSDF forces, and accepting military academy cadets from the other side.
- 3) Port Call of Chinese Naval Vessels, originally scheduled for 1999, is delayed again, in protest to Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine.

• **Observation/Inspection Measures:** Administrative Vice Director of JDA observed Sixth Tank Division and Shanghai Squadron of the East Sea Fleet. (1996).

³⁶ Reconstructed from Jianwei Wang, 'Confidence-Building Measures and China-Japan Relations', in Benjamin L. Self and Yuki Tatsumi, (eds.), *Confidence-Building Measures and Security Issues in Northeast Asia*. Report 33. (The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2000), and Japan Defense Agency. *Defense of Japan 2002 White Paper*.



“Transnational Crime”

Dr.Pisanu Sunthraraks

**Faculty of Political Science
Deputy Director, Institute of East Asian Studies
Thammasat university**

organized by

**Institute of East Asian Studies
Thammasat University**

**Saranrom Institute of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign of Thailand**

Thailand Research Fund

International Crime Organizations are the “dark/evil” twin of Multinational Corporations (MNC) and the Non - government Organizations (NGO)

“ We live in a world with 17th century philosophy of sovereignty, reinforced by 18th century judicial model, defended by 19th century concept of law enforcement, trying to come to term with 20th century technology”

“The 21st century will belong to international criminals”

“ A country without crime is a country without freedom”

“Transnational Crime”

Dr.Pisanu Sunthraraks

1.Introduction

This paper will dwell on transnational crime, international criminal organizations, and their impacts as an example of non-traditional security issue (defined here as any type of development not based on the Cold-War frame of reference) in order to describe what to expect from them in the years to come. We are currently in the midst of what is known as the post - Cold War reality best described as being trade-based, global in scope with a variety of “non-state” actors (sovereignty-free) , technology-driven (ICT, in particular), highly-complex in nature and lacking a social or humanistic dimension.

So much has taken place since the late 1980's, development that have been lumped together under the all-encompassing term of “globalization”. Various development ensued, generating mind-boggling debates and never - ending arguments such as :

1) The contention that the state will have lesser role to play as it is giving the way to the private sector and “non-state” entities such as the transnational corporations, International organization, NGO's, etc.

2) The emergence of many regional groupings whose number has been on the rise and difficult to keep up.

3) The return of “civilizations” as an important factor influencing international relations as the concept of nation-states is slowly fading to the sidelines.

4) Information has become a vital raw material in the production process that turned out to be extremely competitive as information and communication technology gradually interconnected every regions of the world and established itself the “lingua franca” of the day.

5) The globalization of production and finance capital where the movement of capital is just “a click away” and easily concealed in various “off-shore virtual entities while different companies are racing to find the cheapest locations for their manufacturing platforms (China seems to be the favorite destination).

6) Expanding scope of the mass media sprouting the virtues of “consumerism”, universalizing the American spirit (fast-food culture and democracy) and proselytizing Washington's agenda for the world.

Proponents of globalization emphasize the contention that there will be more opportunities for everyone to have a better life inspite of having to bear with the ethos of hardwork and competitions. Critics, on the other hand, point to the “dark side” of the phenomenon reminding us about and increasing social inequalities and less privacy as some unpleasanties we will likely experience sooner than later.

Whichever side one may be identified with on this issue, we have to admit that globalization (whether understood as a process, an ideology or “state-of-being) remains incomplete because not all markets are integrated and not every country is interconnected. Globalization, therefore, needs to be assessed in a situation and actor-specific way according to actors' resources, skills, strategic choices or policies. It is also a “double-edged” sword that provides empowerment and constraints at the same time, thereby exerting pressure on the states and societies to change accordingly.

The new reality collectively termed as “globalization” has also generated several challenges for us to overcome, some of which include.

1) drug trafficking (\$400 billion every year) 2) arms trafficking 4) intellectual property rights violations 5) money laundering and 6) the smuggling of people.



All these activities incidentally fall under the domain of international organized crime, a “non-state”, “sovereignty-free” actor whose prominence is rapidly on the rise as our world has transformed itself from an ideological battlefield (capitalism versus communism) to a new frontier where legality is pitted against illegality.

The following sections will describe how the globalization of trade, democracy and technology provide the “fertile ground” for transnational crime to flourish. The widespread illegal activities perpetrated by the various ethnic criminal groups whose operations are not bounded by geography will hopefully, make us realize that these “non-state”, “sovereignty-free” actors need to be treated as a security threat, not just a police related law enforcement matter.

2. Why is crime transnational?

Organized crime had long had a transnational dimension even though in the past, we may have viewed related activities as being rather domestic in kind and largely a law enforcement concern. The perception that has sidelined organized crime to local scenes is probably a result of the pre-occupation at the time which concentrated on containing the spread of communism.

Organized crime has always been a topic of interests shared by the film moguls of Hollywood whose portrayal of the mafias has never failed to attract movie goers year in and year out. The Italian mafias, we learned (from movies and books), started out as “associations” to help uprooted compatriots adjust to the complexities of their new home (America) but later expanded by engaging in all types of illegal activities (prostitution, alcohol, drugs, etc). The mafias also contributed to the World War II Allied efforts in Europe through the connection and exploits of Lucky Luciano.

In Asia, we think mostly about the Chinese organized crime which also originated (in their newly –adopted countries) as “associations” to help their ethnic kins and later branched out into ventures that include shady as well as legitimate business (restaurants, gambling dens, sweat shops, illegal money transactions, etc.). These groups profit heavily by relying on the “Chinese connection “with tentacles spread out all over the various regions of the world, thereby providing an extensive network for conducting movements of money, people and drugs, not to mention all types of contraband goods without too much difficulties.

Today, in our post-Cold-War world, the rising star of international organized crime has to be the Russians who have established assorted kinds of cooperative arrangements with criminal groups all over the world.

Why is international organized crime likely to increase in our near future? (in fact, activities described as being criminal or illegal in nature, have been on the rise noticeably ever since the late 1980's and 1990's by many folds). The answers to this question can be summed up by pointing to the changing nature and impacts brought in by the interplay of politics (democracy is the “name of the game” today) market forces (neo-liberalism that encourage/ generate intense competition and advocate wide-open market together with the free movement of capital) and technology (information-communication technology which is supposed to have “interconnected” all regions of the world as well as universalized the “consumer culture” and related values normally associated with the West). International organized crime did benefit tremendously as the playing field has been levelled to accommodate their activities largely-driven by the profit motive just like any other legitimate business enterprise.

In order to elaborate further, we can say that international organized crime has expanded tremendously because of the following development :



1) global expansion of trade, technology, transportation, communication, etc. We are no longer held captive by time and distance but can venture forth with relative ease in our "borderless world".

2) Population movements and growth of ethnic networks. In the past, there were many "diasporas" due to religious or political reasons. Later on we hear about the Indians, the Turks and the Chinese. The breakdown of the Soviet Union, the return of Hongkong to China and the unification of Europe have all contributed to a mass exodus of people from one region to another.

Enigration, for instance, has helped the Soviet government to empty their prisons and asylums by exporting their worst problems to the West (in a manner similar what Cuba did in the 1980's with the Mariel case where thousand of convicts were dumped on the U.S. as refugees seeking shelters.) The "neocolonization" of Eastern Europe and Germany today by Russian organized crime is a by-product of past emigration policies.

3) The global financial system has multiple points of access whereby all manners of transactions can be conducted with guaranteed privacy and security. (in a speedy, faceless manner with no questions asked and the ability to have the requested amount wired to any destination of choice).

4) Growth in attractive markets and sources for certain commodities high in demand (such as various types of drugs, synthetic and natural, in the 80's and the 90's, "faked arts" and real ones from Eastern Europe in the 1980's human organs, endangered species, etc.) leading to very profitable returns.

5) Obsolete tools, inadequate laws, inefficient bureaucratic arrangements and ineffective strategies on the part of the "good guys" or the law enforcement authorities given the task of containing if not outright eliminating, organized crime.

Do not forget that with abundant wealth, international organized crime can either confront , corrupt or coopt the government as well as infiltrate the legal sectors of the economy (and perhaps wrest a significant share of the market from legitimate business operators). These groups can also procure "state of the art" technology to manage certain crime efficiently considering the fact that most governments are saddled with tight budgets, bureaucratic (slow and self-contesting) mode of operation, media scrutiny and the electorates. (which are extremely sensitive to any mass campaign that would impinge upon their rights as citizens).

3.Organized Crime : The case of the Russian Mafias

Since globalization is the "name of the game" as many contend, then one can also argue that what we will all be soon experiencing is the globalization of crime through information and communication technology that has well-advanced beyond the grips of existing laws aimed at controlling them.

With this framework in mind, the international criminal organizations represent the dark and evil counterparts of multinational corporations, the NGO'S, and international organization (WHO, ILO, WTO, etc.), all of whom are busily jockeying for a piece of the action and profits in the new wide-opened "border-less" terrain.

A good example indicative of the scale of operation and "networking" of international criminal activities has to do with the of the Russian mafias whose existence predate the downfall of the Soviet Union.

Interested observers described Russia as a full-fledged mafiocracy long before the fall of communism. Six organized crime groups operated from Moscow while four are based in St. Petersburg. Russian organized crime groups launder \$ 1 billion a month through Cyprus



and \$1 billion through Israel. The Swiss banks have assisted Russian criminal organizations in laundering \$ 40 billion since 1991 and by 1994, these groups were able to wire money to finance operations throughout the world with relative ease.

Organized crime is the only effective entity in Russia, controlling over 40% of state-owned business and 80-90% of the banks. Its share of all alcohol sales (generating an attractive income of \$ 15 billion a year), petrol distribution and pharmaceuticals is about 2/3 of the total volume of operation.

Russian organized crime will supply weapons of choice (conventional and otherwise) to Asian organized crime as well as liberation groups (and many others "on the fringe") in exchange for access to a network of Chinese restaurants for money laundering purpose or for drugs of all kinds to be distributed in Europe and other parts of the world.

Russians and Colombians have formed a strategic alliance at a meeting in Vienna in 1991 and 1995. The Colombians would barter cocaine for distribution in Russia in exchange for whatever commodities they need. (surplus Soviet military equipments such as helicopters and light aircrafts to transport cocaine to their destinations while the more conventional arms would be used against the government military forces that have tried, in vain, to eliminate the narcotraffickers.)

The Russians have also agreed with their Italian counterpart on the arrangement to spread heroin in Eastern Europe.

Asian organized crime has opened restaurants as a front for various illegal operations. In Vienna alone, there are 550 Chinese restaurants with only 50 that appear to be capable enough of sustaining regular business while the other 500 "places of culinary delights " seem to be without any legitimate source of income (they, of course, function as launderers of Russian money)

In Germany, Russian organized crime is responsible for 1/3 of all crimes committed (drugs, prostitution, computer frauds, extortion and thefts) and launder the income generated by utilizing the 200 or 50 gambling parlors they control.

Russian organized crime is also very busy in Eastern Europe, their old turfs of operations, where they have bought several banks and tried to become credible/respectable in the eyes of the public as venture capitalists.

Eastern Europe has also facilitated operations that violate human rights or are "outrageously unethical" such as the mutilating of organs (highly-prized and much in demand in the West) from the mentally-ill, killing for needed organs, adoption of children from poor countries to be later used as "spare parts" if the price given is attractive enough and "baby farming" for adoption by foreigners (one form of "child trafficking" which, in some circle, is perceived to be a humane act worthy of praise)

Russian organized crime is not, in any way, like the Italian mafias whose evolution has been romanticized and made familiar to us all courtesy of the Hollywood film industries. The Russians have no organization structure and no pyramid structures. They operate in small groups and co-operate on "ad-hoc" basis; features that pretty much explain why they are dangerous and difficult to police with the demise of the Soviet union (and the absence of domestic control over weapons, scientists, nuclear materials, etc.) and the easing of restrictions over movements of people in Europe, one does not need much creative thinking or Hollywood box-office hits to realize the fertile ground made available for Russian organized crime to "dance through the crowd" undetected and profiting at the same time.



4.Organized Crime Activities : Some examples from Asia

The following section will provide an overview of existing (illegal) activities in East and Southeast Asia in order to demonstrate how lucrative this part of the world has turned out to be for organized crime. No highlight or profiling of any organized crime group in the region will be provided since we are more interested in describing how the changing realities based on the interplay of politics, market forces and (information and communication) technology has transformed this area into an open playground for all kinds of activities , legal as well as illegal such as.

1) Human trafficking. Southeast this is no stranger to regional movements of people from one place to another. The vibrant Indian and Chinese communities in the region well-reflect how these two dominant and “tight-knitted” overseas transplants have successfully managed to thread the fine line by blending professionally with the (new) host societies on the one hand, and retaining their “cultural roots” for many generation on the other. (think about the Indian women’s choice of attires; the Chinese practice of ancestral worships, for example).

Whether in the past or the present (and definitely in the future) movements of people will always be there, regardless of how dangerous or costly the process may be (stories about Chinese illegals paying a fortune only to die due to asphyxiation in a ship - container or getting caught and sent back home right away are still reverberating in our ears). Many people are still driven by the hope and dreams for a better life and opportunities. Poverty and ignorance often transform these hopeful souls into easy prey of traffickers (some of whom end up by losing their farmland and other priced possessions in exchange for the chance to work overseas where the paycheck is much higher than on the homefronts).

It is estimated that in the late 1990’s early 2000, around 700,000-1,000,000 women and children are trafficked every year, half of whom come from Asia.

Closer to home, one finds Vietnamese women being sent to Cambodia to supply the local sex industry and to China and Taiwan for marriage. Cambodians, meanwhile, are shipped to Thailand, Taiwan and Singapore and often end up as beggars, sex slaves or domestic labor.

The accounts provided above have a striking resemblance to certain events in the last decade where 200,000 women and children from Bangladesh were sent to Pakistan to work as prostitutes. Another 200,000 served as maids in the Middle East (where their financial income and sanity rest entirely on the whims of individual employers) while the boys, because of their slender bodies, were much in demand as camel jockeys.

Illegal migrants have to pay smugglers whose fortune has been estimated to be in the vicinity of \$ 7 billion a year.

2) Intellectual Property Rights Violation

People in Southeast and East Asia want to be seen as being “modern”, “successful” and “rich”. As a result, they have to follow the rituals of “showing off”, no matter how much social animosity such display may generate. One easy way of doing so is by sporting “designer” products to convince those around you that you definitely got “taste” and “style”.

South Korea is estimated to have produced 1 million fake European handbags and wallets a year (they are better known to potential customers as the “super-copy” due to the exquisite craftsmanships and other efforts put into imitating the original products. South Korea turns out the best imitation products, with China closely behind).



These products get sold easily because of the high demand and that nobody can really tell the difference between the supercopy and the original one.

Since 1997 many “supercopy” goods found their way to Tokyo, Hongkong, Los Angeles and even Bangkok.

Counterfeits may satisfy the (artificial media-induced, consumer-based) needs of some people who gets their thrill when other see them as being “trendy”. Counterfeiters, however, undermine the legitimate local brands by preventing them from getting their roots in the ground.

China, at the moment, is the biggest “counterfeiter” of DVD, CD, leather goods, etc. European rogue individuals are running training courses for the Chinese counterfeiters in order to help them modernize and upgrade their skills (to produce illegal goods).

Offenders caught get light sentences, giving one the impression that the Chinese authority is not serious in eliminating this problem (some have argued that not much enforcement on this matter may be a result of the fact that these operations are linked to sons and daughters of prominent individuals very high up in the Chinese communist Party hierarchy).

China is also notorious for pirating CD’s and DVD’s. (Some keen observers have tried to find positive outcomes from such gross violation of intellectual property rights by arguing that easy access to cheaply priced American box-office hits has paved the way for future. Hollywood penetration of the large Chinese market. They also added that exposure to pornography has led to more sexual adventure and fulfilment among the consenting adults!). Crackdown of big factories and the seizures of machines (used for producing “faked” CD’s and DVD’s) in China and some other parts of Asia forced the counterfeiters to switch to small-scale operations. An example attesting to this new mode of operation is the use of DVD-R and CD-R “burners” all piled up in stacks and arranged by rows. (The production of “pirated cassettes” in Thailand 15 years ago operated in similar fashion where one can find small rooms with stacks of cassette recorders engaging in illegal work.)

This tendency of using small-scale, easy to move, DVD-burning machines is expected to be on the rise as the number of burning machines will likely increase from a total of 4.8 million units in 2002 to around 55 million by 2005. Pirated CD’s grew from 400 million in 1998 to over a billion in 2002 as a result of the explosion of CD burners which total 510 million in 2002. In Latin America, pirated music comes mostly in CD-R forms, not from discs shipped directly from Asian pressers. (this development reflects how certain publicly-available technology can easily be used to facilitate all kinds of illegal activities.

3) Arms trafficking Reports have been made about the guns and ammunitions of the Tigers of Tamil Eelam (in Sri Lanka) as having been procured in Southeast Asia and transferred in the international water near Phuket (Thailand).

Not too long ago, we all know that guns and other types of weapons used by the various ethnic forces in Myanmar have been obtained from Cambodia and transported across Thailand. (the shoulder-launched rockets costing less than \$2,000 each and in the hands of the Shan United Army have successfully deter the military forces from Yangon and made them think twice before even thinking of invading the Shan region in the past.)

4) Drug trafficking : Southeast Asia used to be on the top of the list of opium growers and heroin producers’. The area known as the “Golden Triangle” has, in the past, achieved bountiful opium- harvest with output being close to the annual volume attained in the “Golden Crescent” region, or Afghanistan, in particular. (Today, opium and heroin-related production has moved to Mexico, in order to be closer to the American market).



Heroin from Southeast Asia used to be carried to Europe (Rotterdam being the destination as well as distribution center) by African “mules” (Nigerians, mostly, who are paid around \$ 5,000 each for their services. If caught and confined in Thai jails, these Nigerians and other African “mules” are provided regular meals and sleeping places that are comparably more pleasant than what they are normally used to in their home countries. Thus, a “win-win” situation for these high-risk operations, at least in the eyes of the African risk-takers) where Chinese restaurants operated by (believe it or not) Singaporeans (from a country noted for its “zero- tolerance drug policy”) handle the distribution side.

Ecstasy from Holland (the drug of choice of the young generations in many parts of the world, produced at a relatively cheap price and under the control of the Israeli Mafia), meanwhile, find its way back to Southeast Asia courtesy of the Singaporeans who sell the drug for a huge profit. (If one reads Thai newspapers during the last 10 years, one cannot help but notice that reports on the distribution of ecstasy in Thailand and arrests made always involved Singaporeans most of the time).

The various accounts provided above are only meant to demonstrate the nature and scope of illegal or criminal operations currently in existence in Southeast Asia and their “transnational” links. The playing field is wide-open with attractive/lucrative markets high in demand for all types of commodities and service.

5. Why is it difficult to combat crime and what has been done ? **(and what needs to be done ?)**

Modern states are not well – equipped to fight “transnational, state - less” international, organized, crime groups (as well as terrorist groups) as the enemies failed to reveal themselves and are difficult to track. Crimes are not bounded by geography, while the criminal perpetrators are state – less, not hampered by sovereignty and can operate swiftly (given the availability of “top of the line” technology and their extensive “ethnic networks” and associate groups).

Combating international organized crime may require unprecedented cooperation between civil and military agencies, intelligence – sharing, and considerations on what civil liberties need to be sacrificed to achieve the goal.

Criminal groups, due to their wealth and sophisticated technology (giving them the “edge” or “one - step” advantage over any existing government) can undermine state sovereignty, challenge state authority (directly on through corruption) and subvert government monopoly of the use of violence. (think about Colombia where the production and sales of cocaine have given rise to a situation where narco – traffickers successfully set up their very own “state within a state” while the government forces lack the ability and means to control and administer the whole country. Our next door neighbor, Myanmar, is also experiencing something similar to the Colombian situation.)

Activities undertaken by criminal groups not only violate human rights (trafficking of women and children for sex; selling human organs acquired through “unethical” means) but also undermine regulatory regimes (trafficking of endangered species; toxic waste) as well as threaten non – proliferation (of nuclear materials and technology) and arms embargoes and undermine local trade and commerce (by engaging in intellectual property rights violation).

Success of organized crime in any one particular country depends on the degree of vulnerabilities and capacity (to enforce law and respond accordingly to perceived as well as real threats) of individual states.



There has been a series of attempts to eliminate or, at least, contain the influences of international organized crime first by focusing on drug trafficking and, later on money – laundering.

The World Ministerial Conference on organized transnational crime held in Naples, Italy, in November in 1994 is perhaps the landmark event reflecting the need to get serious in tackling the problem.

At this meeting, there was a call for enhanced knowledge about the crime challenge and capacity of the criminal justice system to respond; assistance given to various states to draft legislation and regulations against organized crime; the need for improved international cooperation and the technical assistance to enhance capacity.

Other agencies of importance working toward the elimination of transnational of crime include Interpol (whose legal status has been hazy so far), Europol (faces problems with the need to establish safeguards for the protection of data and personal privacy and the sensitivities of sharing national data) and the World Customs Organization (in charge of harmonizing customs procedures through out the world.)

In our part of the world, the 4th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on transnational Crime (AMMTC) and the 1st AMMTC+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) convened here in Bangkok on January 8, 2004 marked the beginning of cooperation in combating transnational crime among countries in the region.

Recently, a lot of attention has been given to the use of financial targeting as a mean to undermine the international organized crime (and terrorists) capacity for conducting their illegal operations.

Financial wars and the freezing of assets, however, have proven to be difficult due to the channels of all sorts available for exploitation by international organized crime such as) the off – shore facilities (in the Caribbean area, for example) 2) correspondent banking and 3) several alternative remittance systems (that are difficult to monitor or trace).

There is also a lack of “political will” at the national level in many countries and bureaucratic problems when it comes to implementing regulatory reforms as anti – money – laundering system may appear to be too complicated (or, perhaps, even too overwhelming a task to carry out effectively) or not appropriate to handle certain tasks (such as terrorist financial sources). Such apprehensive posture, in some part, may explain why, until now, little wealth has been interdicted and put beyond the reach of criminals outside the United States of America.

On order to combat the financial capacities of international organized crime, several obstacles need to be overcome including the technical (ability to identify, control and enforce measure against organized crime financing), bureaucratic, conceptual and coordination aspects.

Can we really do something that is different and more promising than whatever policies and strategies that have already been implemented for years to no avail ?

The answer to this question is a disappointing “ no “ since the government is pitted against market forces while bureaucracies have their hands full against (ethnic and criminal) networks whose activities are transnational and efficiently managed by relying on very advanced technology.

Aside from the lack of political will due to domestic “structural “limitations and the absence of appropriate laws and enforcement mechanisms , one must also realize that our “open societies “ based on free trade and democracy make it extremely difficult sometimes to introduce “counter-measures” to organized crime activities as they may impinge upon the “ basic rights” of the people.



In the case of Europe, for example, there are too many agencies, hierarchies conflicting and competing technology (the computer system). Only Holland and Germany are determined enough and interested in establishing a European FBI (Europol does exist but there is a big problem of who is really in charge). On the legal aspect, one finds a conflict between the British Common Law and the Napoleonic Code of Continental Europe.

One keen observer of the crime scene argued that to eliminate crime, Europe will have to turn into a totalitarian police environment (which can never happen). Otherwise, there is nothing much that we can do besides making calls for the strengthening of multilateral organization (and institutions), adoption of new strategies and mechanisms and to move from repression to regulation (this last item is easier said than done and involves the legalization of activities and substances prohibited in the past). The topic is widely debated today as comparisons are being made between the American and European approach. Unless we can really come up with some innovative set of policies and strategies, conferences on international organized crime can be convened every once in a while with new "improvisations" based on the need for more cooperation among nations, new strategies to contain organized crime, assistance to improve state capacity, etc. with no "success stories" in sight.

Meetings of this sort can become the object of ridicule by the press which views these conventions as nothing more than the opportunity for "photo-taking" sessions enjoyed by the various ministers in attendance.

In spite of the fact that the future of organized crime eradication campaigns does not look promising at all and recent reports indicating that many sources of terrorist funding are similar to those of criminal enterprises (6 out of 10 activities including drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping, robbery, fraud, gambling, smuggling and trafficking of counterfeit goods) making the situation quite bleak, there is still a need for more "public participation" and social awareness campaigns where more information can be disseminated together with the installation of a culture making everyone view himself/herself as a stakeholder. The public has not played any role so far related to the elimination of organized crime. Remaining on "the margins of society" as mere spectators and, at times, being the very victims is no longer a proper social response. The people should be empowered to do something constructive in order to ensure a "crime-free" society for future generations.

There is no conclusion to be made now as we become increasingly engaged in the fight between legality and illegality (one that has replaced the ideological conflict between capitalism and communism). We can only hope that things will improve even though existing reality indicates otherwise.



“EAST ASIAN COOPERATION AND HUMAN SECURITY”

Mohamed Jawhar Hassan

Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia

Organized by
Institute of East Asian Studies
Thammasat University

Saronrim Institute of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign of Thailand

Thailand Research Fund

EAST ASIAN COOPERATION AND HUMAN SECURITY

Mohamed Jawhar Hassan

INTRODUCTION

A strong case can be made for the notion that in East Asia and elsewhere where developing countries predominate, human security issues are far more important than conventional state-centred security issues, except when war and conflict are urgent and widespread issues. Yet both in the region and elsewhere people-centred security has been poorly addressed as so-called “realist” thinking centred on the state continues to dominate strategy and discourse both in the government as well as non-government security community.

Yet this would not be altogether true, because key elements of human security have consistently been addressed by countries not from the viewpoint of human security (which after all is a term that only came into vogue since the mid-1990s), but often in their own right as socio-economic and other issues. Hence poverty, malnutrition, disease, human trafficking, etc. have been the focus of consistent attention by many East Asian countries.

The initiation of East Asian cooperation in the form of the ASEAN+3 process however raises the question of how far and how best human security issues can be addressed in the regional process.

This paper attempts to deal with this question. It begins with a brief survey of the extent of key human security issues confronting the region.

The UNDP definition of the term “human security” in its 1994 Report is adopted here: “It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily

Myanmar are not available, but the former is destitute (though the situation has improved slightly in recent years) and the latter is among the least developed economies of the world. The more developed and affluent countries of the region like Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Brunei have negligible poor in comparison.

Poverty in East Asia

Country	Population in Poverty (%), National Poverty Line	Proportion of Population Below \$1 A Day (%)	Number of People (millions)	Proportion of Population Below \$2 A Day (%)	Number of People (millions)
China	< 2, (urban), 3.5 (rural) in 2000	16.1 (2000)	204.5m	46.7 (2001)*	596m
ROK	3.6 (2000)	< 2 (1998)	<926,000	<2 (1998)**	<926,000
Cambodia	35.9 (2000)	34.1 (1997)	3.7m	77.7 (1997)*	8.4m
Indonesia	18.2 (2002)	7.5 (2002)	15.8m	52.4 (2002)*	110.5m
Lao PDR	38.6 (1997)	26.3 (1997)	1.27m	73.2 (1997-98)*	3.53m
Malaysia	8.1 (1999), this refers to percentage of poor households	<2 (1997)	<433,400	9.3 (1997)**	2.01m
Myanmar	22.9 (1997)				
Philippines	34.2 (2000)	14.6 (2000)	11.4m	46.4 (2000)*	36.4m
Thailand	13.1 (2000)	<2 (2000)	<1.2m	32.5 (2000)*	20.3m
Vietnam	37.4 (1998)	17.7 (1998)	13.4m	63.7 (1998)*	48.1m
TOTAL			252.6m		826.2m

*Based on expenditure

**Based on income

Source: ADB Key Indicators 2003, World Development Indicators 2004

Vulnerability to Financial Crisis

The 1997-1998 financial crisis that swept through South Korea and several Southeast Asian countries devastated their economies and raised concerns in neighbouring states as well. The value of investments, real income and purchasing power all deteriorated sharply. Many were fortunate to recover after varying periods of difficulty, but never yet to their previous levels. The political, economic, social and security repercussions were greatest in Indonesia.

The affected regional economies are now more robust in the financial sector, but they remain vulnerable to massive speculative capital flows, and another regional crisis is not altogether unlikely in the future.

Food Security

Food security is tied to factors such as unemployment levels, wage levels, natural disasters, war and conflict, etc. Again, East Asia has made tremendous progress in strengthening food security in the last three decades. Nevertheless food security remains a serious problem in several countries, and critical in a few. Famine is not a significant problem in the region however, unlike in sub-Saharan Africa.

Undernourishment is extensive in Cambodia (38 percent of the population), Laos (22 percent), Philippines (22 percent), Vietnam (19 percent), and North Korea (34 percent). The number of undernourished in the region is estimated at close to 200 million, not much below the number of East Asians living below US\$1 a day.

Like poverty, food insecurity is one of the push factors behind population displacement and outflows of people, another dimension of human security.

Prevalence of Undernourishment

Country	Number of people undernourished, 1999-2001 (millions)	Proportion of undernourished in total population, 1999-2001 (%)
China (includes Taiwan but not Hong Kong)	135.3	11
ROK	0.7	-
Cambodia	5.0	38
Indonesia	12.6	6
Lao PDR	1.2	22
Malaysia	0.5	-
Myanmar	3.2	7
Philippines	16.8	22
Vietnam	15.1	19
DPRK	7.5	34
Total	197.9	

Source: The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2003

Health Security

Health security is assessed here from the viewpoint of three indicators, namely mortality and reproductive health, incidence of HIV, and prevalence of malaria and tuberculosis.

The pattern of countries with inadequate human security is again distressingly similar. The challenges are greatest in the countries that are least able to shoulder them. Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are the most affected, while the maternal mortality rate is disproportionately high in the Philippines. Incidence of HIV is disproportionately high in Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar, and is showing signs of resurgence after a period of decline. Malaria has a geographical dimension to its prevalence, hence its higher manifestation in countries like Cambodia and near absence in China.

Mortality and Reproductive Health

Country	Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births), 2001	Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100,000 live births), latest year
China	31	56 (1998)
ROK	5	20 (1996)
Cambodia	97	437 (2000)
Indonesia	33	213 (2000)
Lao PDR	87	530 (2000)
Malaysia	8	20 (1999)
Myanmar	77	170 (1995)
Philippines	29	172 (1998)
Singapore	3	2 (1999)
Thailand	24	13 (2000)
Vietnam	30	95 (2000)

Source: ADB Key Indicators 2003

Estimated number of people living with HIV

Country	Adults and children, end 2003
China	840,000
Japan	12,000
ROK	8,300
Brunei	<200
Cambodia	170,000
Indonesia	110,000
Lao PDR	1,700
Malaysia	52,000
Myanmar	330,000
Philippines	9,000
Singapore	4,100
Thailand	570,000
Vietnam	220,000
TOTAL	2,327,300

Source: UNAIDS 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic

Prevalence of Malaria and Tuberculosis

Country	Prevalence of Malaria (per 100,000 people), 2000	Death Rate Associated with Malaria (per 100,000 people), 2000	Prevalence of Tuberculosis (per 100,000 people), latest year	Death Rate Associated with Tuberculosis (per 100,000 people), latest year
China	1	0	113	19
ROK	9	0	70	10
Cambodia	476	14	585	77
Indonesia	920	1	271	65
Lao PDR	759	28	158	31
Malaysia	57	1	120	22
Myanmar	224	20	162	34
Philippines	15	2	297	67
Singapore		0	46	4
Thailand	130	8	135	27
Vietnam	95	9	179	20

Source: ADB Key Indicators 2003

Environmental Security

Land area covered by forests is critically low in China, Philippines and Singapore, while carbon dioxide emissions are predictably higher in Brunei and Singapore. North Korea has achieved an astounding record with regard to population with access to improved water and sanitation. Virtually the entire population, rural as well as urban, has access, vying with the city-state of Singapore. For once, it is ahead of its much more developed and affluent southern sibling.

Resource scarcity and depletion due to severe environmental stress caused by rapid industrialisation, population growth, urbanisation, pollution and deforestation is cause for serious concern.

Transborder haze is an intermittent and occasionally serious problem in Southeast Asia. In 1997 forest fires in Indonesia and the resultant haze that spread from the country to

Malaysia and Singapore caused losses of US\$4.5 million due to the drop in tourism revenue, health problems (at least 20 million Indonesians alone affected) and the loss of forests and agricultural land.

Forest Cover, Carbon Dioxide Emissions and CFC Consumption

Country	Land area covered by forests (%), 2000	GDP per unit of energy use (PPP US\$ per kg of oil equivalent), 2000	Carbon dioxide emissions per capita (metric tons), 1999	Consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs (ODP metric tons), 2001*
China	17.5	4.1	2.3	33,923
Japan	64.0	6.1	9.1	6
ROK	63.3	3.6	8.4	6,724
Brunei	83.9	3.0 (1998)	14.2	31
Cambodia	52.9	..	0.1	..
Indonesia	58.0	4.2	1.2	5,003
Lao PDR	54.4	..	0.1	41
Malaysia	58.7	4.3	5.4	1,947
Myanmar	52.3	..	0.2	39
Philippines	19.4	6.8	1.0	2,049
Singapore	3.3	3.9	13.7	22
Thailand	31.1	5.1	3.3	3,375
Vietnam	30.2	4.2	0.6	243

* Data refers to CFCs controlled under the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, measured in metric tons multiplied by a factor of ozone-depleting potential (ODP).

Source: Human Development Report 2003

Population with Access to Improved Water and Sanitation

Country	Rural population with sustainable access to an improved water source, (%), 2000	Urban population with sustainable access to an improved water source, (%), 2000	Urban population with access to improved sanitation (%), 2000
China	66	94	69
ROK	71	97	76

Cambodia	26	54	56
Indonesia	69	90	69
Lao PDR	29	61	67
Malaysia	94	..	..
Myanmar	66	89	84
Philippines	79	91	93
Singapore	..	100	100
Thailand	81	95	96
Vietnam	72	95	82
DPRK	100	100	99

Source: Human Development Report 2003

Personal Security

Personal security refers to protection of the people from crime as well as from the threat of conflict and war. Reliable and comparable figures for the majority of the countries is difficult to come by, but Singapore, Brunei and Japan would perhaps provide among the best environments for personal security.

Community and Political Security

Among the key indicators are internal displacement of population, asylum seekers and refugees.

Internal Displacement

The Asia Pacific is home to an estimated 3.6 million internally displaced people, according to the report *Internal Displacement: A Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2003*. This makes it the second largest region to be affected by conflict-driven displacement. Myanmar is assessed to have the largest number: 600,000 to one million. Over 500,000 are displaced in Indonesia, mostly in Maluku and East Java. Some 400,000 people were displaced amid fighting in southern Mindanao in early 2003.

Asylum Seekers and Refugees

Refugees and asylum seekers are mainly from Myanmar, China, Cambodia and Vietnam. Nearly all of them are victims of political oppression and conflict. China has by far the largest population of refugees, followed by Thailand.

Refugees, Asylum-seekers and Others of Concern

Country	Refugees	Asylum-seekers	Others of concern	Total
Cambodia	76	46	-	122
China (not including Hong Kong)	299,354	43	-	299,397
Indonesia	233	68	16,697	16,998
Japan	2,266	428	-	2,694
Malaysia	442	9,205	69,279	78,926
Myanmar	-	-	-	-
Philippines	108	38	1,691	1,837
ROK	25	139	-	164
Singapore	1	2	-	3
Thailand	119,053	2,657	5	121,715
Vietnam	15,360	-	-	15,360

Source: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2003 Global Refugee Trends

Refugee Population by Major Origin and Country of Asylum, 2003

Origin	Country/Territory of asylum	Population end-year
Cambodia	France	14,303
Cambodia	Vietnam	15,360
China	Canada	5,722
China	Germany	6,940
China	India	92,349
China	United States	21,300
Indonesia	Papua New Guinea	7,491
Lao PDR	France	7,948
Myanmar	Bangladesh	19,743
Myanmar	Thailand	118,762
Vietnam	China	299,287
Vietnam	France	9,274

Vietnam	Germany	25,357
Vietnam	United States	21,250

Source: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2003 Global

Refugee Trends

- The political dimension of human security often also embraces the practice of democratic principles and respect for human rights as part of good governance. While this approach can be generally embraced for East Asia and indeed promoted as norms, it is suggested that the ASEAN+3 process tread softly on democracy in order not to generate tensions within the grouping between democratic and non-democratic states as well as civil society. The corollary of the right of humanitarian intervention to defend human security when extreme violations occur should also be pursued with sensitivity in the region given the often crude double standards and hypocrisy practised by some strong Western states. The ASEAN+3 process however could move more purposefully in the sphere of human rights, especially social, economic and cultural rights.

ASEAN PLUS THREE PROVISIONS FOR HUMAN SECURITY

Besides a general commitment towards promoting political and security cooperation in the region, the ASEAN+3 process makes specific provision for addressing human security issues:

- The East Asia Vision Group Report proposed “advancing human security in particular by facilitating regional efforts for environmental protection and good governance” as a goal for the East Asian community.” It also made specific recommendations for environmental cooperation, as well as “issues affecting human security” such as drug trafficking and illegal migration.
- The East Asia Study Group included poverty alleviation programmes, primary healthcare and cooperation in non-traditional security issues amongst its short-term measures, and closer regional marine environmental cooperation as well as a

framework for energy policies and strategies and action plans in its medium-term and long-term measures.

The ASEAN+3 process has also initiated some human security-related activities.

PROPOSALS FOR EAST ASIAN COOPERATION

Some general thoughts may be in order:

1. Given limited resources, ASEAN+3 should be highly selective in choosing the human security issues it wishes to engage in. It should focus on problems of a trans-border nature that have extensive region-wide relevance.
2. Many critical areas of good governance, poverty alleviation, health security and environmental security are mostly national and not regional in character, and are best addressed and strengthened by the individual countries themselves except where external assistance is being sought. Regional organisations, especially those with limited collective resources and many members with limited capacity, have little relevance or capacity to help. The space for ASEAN+3 involvement is therefore limited, though nevertheless of the utmost significance.
3. The best approach to advance human security is to help build national capacity.
4. Global regional institutions dedicated to supporting programmes in developing countries, like the UNDP and ADB, are often better placed to help in terms of resources and expertise than loosely organised regional cooperation processes like the ASEAN+3.
5. Bilateral and sub-regional cooperation are often more meaningful than region-wide cooperation, for instance in tackling the regional haze problem in Southeast Asia.
6. The ASEAN+3 should go slow on rights and democracy-oriented human security in order not to undermine the nascent process.
7. There are several alternative processes for promoting human security – bilateral, ASEAN, ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, ARF, etc. The most appropriate process should

be chosen, and there may be a need for rationalisation and coordination to avoid duplication.

8. Credible NGOs can play a significant role and make a significant contribution. They should be fully engaged where relevant.

Initiatives in the following areas may be worthy of consideration by ASEAN+3 for further exploration if necessary by NEAT:

1. HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases like SARS and bird flu that have an external or trans-border propensity.
2. Trafficking in illicit drugs. Here the UN Office on Drugs and Crime-operated Regional Cooperative Mechanism to Monitor and Execute the ACCORD (ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Drug) Plan of Action could perhaps be extended to cover Japan and South Korea as well.
3. Trafficking in human persons, whether on its own given the enormity and relevance of the problem to all ASEAN+3 countries, or as part of a Transnational Crime Initiative for Regional Cooperation. In the latter case the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime may provide some pointers.
4. Competition for resources, including marine resources, water and energy could intensify in the years ahead. ASEAN+3 may therefore want to look into food, resource and energy security issues, including sharing of information and technology.
5. Best practices for environmental management and preservation with respect to forests, rivers, etc.



CURRICULUM VITAE

Woondo Choi, Research Professor

Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University
134 Shinchon-Dong, Seodaemun-Ku, Seoul, KOREA
Tel: (office) 02-2123-3509, (Mobile) 016-737-5341, (home) 02-534-1577
e-mail: wdchoi@yonsei.ac.kr

Education

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| Ph.D. Department of Political Science,
University of Colorado, Boulder, CO. | May 1997 |
| B.A. Department of Political Science and
Diplomacy, Yonsei University, KOREA | Feb. 1987 |

Experience

Research Professor Institute of East and West Studies, Mar. 2001 – Present
Yonsei University

Research Interests

- U.S.-Japan-China Security Relationship
- Regional Integration
- Political Economy of Military Expenditure and Defense Industry

Major Publications

- 2003. "Changes in Japanese Defense Policy and the Implications on Korean Security." *National Strategy* 9(2). (Sejong Institute) (in Korean)
- 2003. "Persistence and Change in Japan-China Relationship." *Journal of International and Area Studies* 10(1). (Seoul National University, SIAS Publication in June 2003) (in English)
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- 2004. "Sino-Japanese Cooperation and Conflict in Regional Integration of East Asia." *Sino-Soviet Affairs* 28 (1), 147-171. (in Korean)



CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: **TANAKA, Akihiko**
Sex : Male
Date of Birth : August 7, 1954
Marital Status: Married, Three Children

Current Position: Director and Professor of International Politics
Institute of Oriental Culture
University of Tokyo
7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, JAPAN
tel. (81-3) 5841-5885
fax (81-3) 5800-6938
e-mail tanaka@ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp

Areas of Specialization: theories of world politics; contemporary international relations in East Asia; Japan-U.S. relations; Japan-China relations.

Degrees:

B. A. University of Tokyo, 1977 (International Relations)
Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1981 (Political Science)

Academic Positions:

1981-1983 Researcher, Research Institute for Peace and Security
1983-1984 Research Associate, Department of Social and International Relations,
University of Tokyo
1984-1990 Associate Professor, Department of Social and International Relations,
University of Tokyo
1986-1987 Visiting Professor, Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum
1987-present Research Associate, Research Institute for Peace and Security
1990-1998 Associate Professor, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo
1994-1995 Senior Associate Member, St Antony's College, Oxford
1994-1995 Visiting Scholar, Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, Oxford
1998-present Professor, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo
2002-present Director, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo

Other Positions:

1990-2002 Member, Board of Directors, Asia Pacific Association
1991 Member, Discussion Group on International Cooperation for the Prime
Minister
1991-1992 Special Member, Economic Advisory Council (Economic Planning Agency)
1991-1992 Special Member, Advisory Council on Living Condition (Economic Planning
Agency)
1992 Member, Council on Japan-U.S. Economic Relations (advisory group for
Japan's Foreign Minister)
1992-1994 Special Member, Industrial Structure Council (Ministry of International Trade
and Industry)



CURRICULUM VITAE

- 1992-1996 Member, Abe Fellowship Program Committee, Social Science Research Council (Chair, from 1994 to 1996)
1996-1997 Special Member, Economic Advisory Council (Economic Planning Agency)
1996-2002 Member, Board of Directors, Research Institute for Peace and Security
1998-1999 Member, Asia-Europe Vision Group
1999-2001 Member, East Asia Vision Group
2002 Member, Reform Advisory Board of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2002 Member, Initiative toward Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership Discussion Group (advisory group for Chief Cabinet Secretary)
2002 Member, Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace (advisory group for Chief Cabinet Secretary)
2002 Member, Advisory Group to Consider a Memorial Facility for Remembering the Dead and Praying for Peace (advisory group for Chief Cabinet Secretary)

Awards:

- 1977-1978 Ishizaka Scholar
1994-1995 Ushiba Fellow
1996 Suntory Academic Prize (for *Atarashii chusei*)
2001 Yomiuri Yoshino Sakuzo Prize (for Wado Politikkusu)

Professional Association:

- International Studies Association
Japanese Association of International Relations
Japanese Association of Asian Political and Economic Studies
Japanese Political Science Association
International Institute for Strategic Studies

Major Publications:

- Sekai shisutemu* (The World System) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1989)
Nicchu kankei 1945-1990 (Sino-Japanese Relations, 1945-1990) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1991)
Atarashii chusei: 21 seiki no sekai shisutemu (New Middle Ages: the world system in the 21st century) (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbun-sha, 1996)
Anzen hoshō: sengo 50 nen no mosaku (Security: 50 years exploration in the post war) (Tokyo: Yomiuri shimbun-sha, 1997).
Wado Poritikusu: gurobarizeshon no naka no Nihon gaiko (Word Politics: Japanese Diplomacy under Globalization) (Tokyo: Chikuma-shobo, 2000)
The New Middle Ages: The World System in the 21st Century (Tokyo: The International House of Japan, 2002, LDCB Library Selection No.12, English translation of *Atarashii chusei*).
Fukuzatsusei no sekai: tero no seiki to Nihon (The World of Complexity: Japan and the Century of Terrorism) (Tokyo: Keiso-shobo, 2003)

Akihiko Tanaka is Professor of International Politics and is currently the Director of the Institute of Oriental Culture, the University of Tokyo. He obtained his B.A. in International Relations at the University of Tokyo's College of Arts and Sciences in 1977 and his Ph.D. in Political Science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1981. Mr. Tanaka's specialties include theories of international politics, contemporary international relations in East Asia, and issues in Japan-U.S. relations. He has numerous books and articles in Japanese and English including *The New Middle Ages: The World System in the 21st Century* (Tokyo: The International House of Japan, 2002).



CURRICULUM VITAE

Simon SC Tay

Simon SC Tay LL.B Hons (National University of Singapore) LL.M (Harvard) teaches international law at the National University of Singapore. He is concurrently chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, a non-governmental think tank. Since July 2002, he has been chairman of the National Environment Agency, the country's major agency for environmental protection and public health.

In Fall 2003, he is a visiting professor at the Harvard Law School, teaching international environmental law, with a focus on Asia. He is also teaching at the Fletcher School of International Law and Diplomacy, on ASEAN, East Asia and the Pacific.

He was selected for three terms as a Nominated Member of the Singapore Parliament (1997 – 2001) and has served to lead public consultations on Singapore in the 21st century, the national concept plan, and the Singapore Green Plan 2012.

He was a Fulbright scholar (1993-94) at Harvard Law School, where he won the Laylin prize for the best thesis in international law. In Jan 2000, the World Economic Forum (Davos) named him a "global leader of tomorrow". In 2002, he was awarded an Eisenhower Fellowship, one of Singapore's first non-governmental recipients of this award.

His work on international law and policy focuses on sustainable development, peace and governance, especially in Asia and ASEAN. His scholarly publications include, *Sketching Regional Futures: Pacific Asia in 2022* (forthcoming); *The Enemy Within: Combating Corruption in Asia* (2003); *Reinventing ASEAN* (2001); *Southeast Asian Fires: The Challenge for International Law and Development* (Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 1999); *Preventive Diplomacy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: Principles and Possibilities* (Canberra Papers No. 131, 1999); *Towards a Singaporean Civil Society* (Southeast Asian Affairs 1998); *Asian Dragons & Green Trade* (1996); and *Human Rights, Culture and the Singapore Example* (McGill Law Journal 1996).

He serves on a number of international and regional expert and eminent person panels, including the ASEAN Regional Forum register of eminent persons and experts, the China International Council on Environment and Development, and the Asia Pacific Forum on Environment and Development. In 1999-2000, he co-chaired an eminent persons' group on Japan-ASEAN relations and also served on a joint team to study and negotiate a free trade agreement between Japan and Singapore. In 2002, he attended the World Summit on Sustainable Development as a senior member of the Singapore delegation to the High Level session.

He has spoken to a number of business meetings, including the APEC, PBEC and ASEAN Business Leaders Summits and the World Economic. His comments have featured in various international and regional media, including the BBC World Service, CNN and Newsweek.

Simon previously practised law at large commercial practice and served as coordinator for the Singapore Volunteers Overseas, sending teachers, doctors, and others to Asia and Africa. During his undergraduate years at the National University of Singapore, he was president of the Students' Union for three terms, and led a petition against government policy.

He is also a writer of stories and poems, with five published works. In 1995, he was named Singapore Young Artist of the Year.



CURRICULUM VITAE

Assistant Prof.Dr. Pisanu Sunthraraks

Academic Background

- High School : American School of Brasilia (Brazil), 1973
B.A. : History and Political Science
(University of Kansas), U.S.A., 1976
M.A. : IBERO-AMERICAN STUDIES
(University of Wisconsin at Madison), U.S.A., 1977
M.A. Research Paper : "Authoritarian Regime and Development : The Case of Brazil"
M.A. : Political Science (University of Wisconsin at Madison), U.S.A., 1981
Ph.D. : Political Science (University of Wisconsin at Madison), U.S.A., 1986
Dissertation : Luang Wichit Watakau : Hegemony and Literature

Overseas Experience

- Italy (1957-1961)
Philippines (1965-1972)
Brazil (1972-1973)
U.S.A. (1973-1977) (1980-1986)

Appointments

- Deputy Dean for International Affairs, Faculty of Political Science Thammasat University (1986-1988)
- Director of Project Seminar, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University (1986-1988)
- Consultant, Family Planning Program (USAID) (1988)
- Consultant, "Investment in Thailand," USAID Project (1988)
- Consultant, Narcotics Crops control and substitution Program, Evaluation Project, DEA-Funded program, American Embassy, Bangkok (1989)
- Consultant, Mitsubishi Electric Corp. Regional Office, Bangkok (1991-1998)
- Consultant, Investors Relations Service Co., Singapore (1991 – 2001)
- Director, Intellectual Property Right Association – Head Office (1991-1992)
- Advisor to the Minister of Industry (1997-1998)
- Member, National Committee for Industrial Development (1997 – 1998)
- Member, National Food Institute (1997 – 1998)
- Member, Thailand Productivity Institute (1997 – 2000)
- Board of Director, PTT (2001 – Present)

Courses Taught : at Thammasat University and Other institutions

- Introduction to Political Philosophy
- Comparative Politics
- International Crisis Management
- Politics and Novels
- Latin American Affairs
- Economic and Social Factors in International Relations



CURRICULUM VITAE

Recent Publications

1. *Investment in Thailand*, USAID Project Paper, 1988
2. *Public-Private Sector Cooperation in Thailand*, USAID Project Paper, 1987
3. *Narcotics Crops Substitution in Thailand*, ONCB Report Funded by American Embassy, 1989
4. Numerous Book Reviews in the *Bangkok Post* (1996 – Present)
5. Book Reviews in “Na Ka” Magazine [in Thai] (1992-1995)
6. Numerous articles on social, political, economic and women’s issues in “Na Ka” magazine [in Thai] (1990-1993)
7. Book Reviews in *Vetheethas*, a political economy monthly (1996 – Present)
8. “Cuba : Revolutionary Warrior or Soviet Proxy,” in *Ratasatsan* (1979)
9. “Japanese decline in our borderless world,” a review essay in *Ratasatsan* (1992)
10. *Dependency and Development in Latin America* translation of Cordoso and Falletto’s book, 1979
11. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*, translation of James Scott’s book, 1979
12. *The Newly-Industrialized Countries : Some of Observations*, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, 1989
13. *Korean Investment in Thailand* Institute of East Asian Studies, Thammasat University, 1998.
14. *Taiwan’s Model of Development*, Research Monograph, Thammasat University, 1998.
15. “South Korean emergence as a NIC,” paper delivered at a conference on NiC-dom, Thammasat University, 1992.
16. “Labor Relations in Post-Authoritarian Korea,” paper delivered at a work-shop on “Security in Northeast Asia,” held at Japan Institute, Thammasat University, Rangsit Campus, 1988.
17. “A Critique of Dependency Theory,” paper delivered at conference on “Multinational Corporations and Development” held at Thammasat University, 1983.



CURRICULUM VITAE

Dato' Mohamed Jawhar Hassan

Dato' Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, Director-General, ISIS Malaysia, served with the government before he left to join ISIS as Deputy Director-General in May 1990. He was appointed Director-General of ISIS on 1 March, 1997.

His positions in government included Director-General, Department of National Unity; Under-Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs; Director (Analysis) Research Division, Prime Minister's Department; Principal Assistant Secretary, National Security Council; and Executive Secretary, Border Security Committee Malaysia/Thailand. He also served as Counsellor in the Malaysian Embassies in Indonesia and Thailand.

In ISIS, his special focus is in the fields of international relations, security and nation-building.

In July, 2002 he was nominated as Asean Regional Forum (ARF) Expert and Eminent Person for the purposes of the ARF Register.

His other positions are Member, Penang State K-ICT Council; Secretariat CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific); Co-Chair of CSCAP Working Group on Cooperative Security and Comprehensive Security; Vice-Chairman, Malaysian National Committee, Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC); Member, Malaysian CSCAP; and Member, Board of Directors, Malacca Institute of Management.

He is/was also:

1. Project Coordinator, Master Plan on Knowledge Economy.
2. Secretariat, Task Force for People Development in the IT Age.
3. Secretariat, Working Group on E-Sovereignty.
4. Member, Government Study Committee on National Coast Guard.

Welcoming Speech
By Assoc. Dr. Naris Chaiyasoot
Rector, Thammasat University
At Welcoming Dinner
The 2nd Meeting of the Network of East Asian Think-Tanks
(NEAT)
16 August 2004 (Time 19.00)
Ballroom 2, 4th Floor, Inter Continental Hotel

Excellencies

Distinguished participants,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the conference dinner this evening. A dinner is an opportunity for conversation. A dinner is a time for companionship, and a dinner is also a time to build our own community.

You often hear the quote, "We live in interesting times." This is indeed a special year. The university is indeed a special place. And I believe we would all agree this conference is a special forum. It is the 70th anniversary of Thammasat University. As the region has changed over seven decades, so has the university. It is our pleasure and honor now to extend our work to the region and indeed to the wider world. It is the second meeting of this NEAT forum on behalf of an East Asian Community. Our universities have played a major role in the origins of the network, and now in building the future of the network.

So let us celebrate this evening the past. Our shared past includes the long, proud history of East Asia. For us here at Thammasat, it includes seventy years of learning and scholarship. And for all of us here, the past includes the promising beginnings of the Northeast East Think-tank Network. We celebrate the present here in Bangkok this evening. Here we meet friends old and new. We learn of our differences and of our common hopes in the shaping of a network. Perhaps most important, we celebrate this evening our shared future. The future includes the critical role of educating Asia in the coming decades of our universities. The future includes the formation of an East Asian Community. And the future includes your task of building the NEAT network.

Let me conclude with again a warm welcome, and best wishes for the success of your conference.

Introduction to the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)

[Inauguration]


The concept of an "East Asian Community" has been spread quietly but steadily leading to the formation of a gigantic trend in the East Asian region. "The Council on East Asian Community" (CEAC) was inaugurated in Japan on May 18, 2004, considerably triggered the launching of "The Network of East Asian Think-tanks" in Beijing and "The East Asia Forum" in Seoul in 2003. The establishment of CEAC was called for by 10 think-tanks such as the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) and the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and 30 scholars such as TANAKA Akihiko, Professor of the University of Tokyo and YOSHITOMI Masaru, President & Chief Research Officer of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry. CEAC consists of representatives from wide-ranging fields in Japan who are interested in the concept of an "East Asian Community", including those who represent businesses corporations such as Nippon Steel Corporation and Toyota Motor Corporation, and government agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Growing momentum for East Asian Community has finally come to take root in Japan whose attitude towards the issue tended to be passive until recently.

[Organization]

As an all-Japan intellectual platform covering business, government, and academic leaders, CEAC aims at the strengthening of intellectual collaboration, the building of intellectual foundation, and the sharing of strategic ideas among them. The membership of CEAC consists of 12 think-tank members, 50 individual members and 15 corporate members as of today. CEAC elected NAKASONE Yasuhiro, former Prime Minister of Japan, as Chairman, and ITO Kenichi, President of JFIR, as President at its Founding Meeting. The basic policy of the management of the Council is directed by the "Caucus" comprising its President and Vice-Presidents. The "Plenary Meeting", which is attended by the members of CEAC, conducts policy-debate among its members and produce policy recommendations as occasions demand.

[Activities]

The activities of CEAC consist of the following four pillars: (1) the Plenary Meeting, (2) the Task Force, (3) the e-CEAC, and (4) the International Exchange. (1) The "Plenary Meeting" is a forum where the members of CEAC are assembled to promote policy debate. "The State of the Concept of East Asian Community and Japan's Strategic Response thereto" is the theme for the first year's discussions in the "Plenary Meeting," which is expected to produce a policy report at the end of the year. (2) The "Task Force" assists the deliberations of the Plenary Meeting, and drafts a policy report to be adopted by the Plenary Meeting. The Task Force for the first year is headed by Prof. TANAKA Akihiko of the University of Tokyo and staffed by Prof. AOKI Tamotsu of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies and 3 other members. (3) The "e-CEAC" is an online network both in Japanese and in English for the purpose of publicity and enlightenment both inside and outside Japan and is accessible at <http://www.ceac.jp/>. (4) The "International Exchange" is a series of programs including the holding in Tokyo of the "Japan-ASEAN Dialogue" in July 2004 and the "Japan-China Dialogue" in September 2004. Both are held in cooperation with the Global Forum of Japan. Also, the "International Exchange" programs include the dispatching of CEAC's delegations of about 10 members to the "Network of East Asian Think-tanks" conference in Bangkok in August 2004, and the "East Asia Forum" conference in Kuala Lumpur in December 2004.



[CEAC Secretariat]

[Address] c/o The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR)

2-17-13-1301 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-0052

[Tel] +81-3-3584-2190

[Fax] +81-3-3589-5120

[E-mail] info@ceac.jp

[URL] <http://www.ceac.jp/e/index.htm>

as of August 15, 2004

Councilors

[NOUE Masayuki] Director-General for International Affairs, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

TANAKA Hitoshi Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

WATANABE Hiroshi Vice-Minister of Finance for International Affairs of Japan

YABUNAKA Mitoji Director-General, Asian-Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

YACHI Shotaro Assistant Cabinet Secretary of Japan

Advisors

ARAKI Hiroshi Adviser, Tokyo Electric Power Co., Ltd.

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IMAI Takashi Honorary Chairman, Nippon Steel Corp.

MAKIHARA Minoru Senior Corporate Advisor, Mitsubishi Corp.

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UESHIMA Shigeji Advisor, Mitsui & Co., Ltd.

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ITO Yoshiro President, Itogumi Co., Ltd.

KAKIZAWA Koji Former Foreign Minister of Japan

YODA Tatsumi Honorary Chairman, Avex Inc.

President

ITO Kenichi President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.

Vice-Presidents

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HATAKEYAMA Noboru Chairman and CEO, Japan Economic Foundation

KURODA Makoto President, Center for Information on Security Trade Control

MIZOGUCHI Zembei President, Japan Center for International Finance

OKAWARA Yoshio President, Institute for International Policy Studies

SATOH Yukio President, the Japan Institute of International Affairs

SHIOYA Takafusa President, Institute for Research Advancement

TANAKA Akihiko Professor, University of Tokyo

WATANABE Akio President, Research Institute for Peace and Security

YAMAMOTO Tadashi President, the Japan Center for International Exchange

YOSHIDA Haruki President, The Yoshida Labo for Economics and Industry, Inc.

YOSHITOMI Masaru President & Chief Research Officer, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry

YOSHITOMI Masaru President & Chief Research Officer, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry

YOSHITOMI Masaru President & Chief Research Officer, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry

Auditors

ICHIKAWA Isao Executive Adviser for Financial Affairs, Keio University

NAKAMURA Kimikazu President, Sankyu Inc.

Think-tank Members (12 Members)

GYOHTEN Toyoo President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs

HATAKEYAMA Noboru Chairman and CEO, Japan Economic Foundation

ITO Kenichi President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.

KURODA Makoto President, Center for Information on Security Trade Control

MIZOGUCHI Zembei President, Japan Center for International Finance

OKAWARA Yoshio President, Institute for International Policy Studies

SATOH Yukio President, the Japan Institute of International Affairs

SHIOYA Takafusa President, Institute for Research Advancement

TAKAGI Yuki Governor, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation

WATANABE Akio President, Research Institute for Peace and Security

YAMAMOTO Tadashi President, the Japan Center for International Exchange

YOSHIDA Susumu Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia

Individual Members (50 Members)

AMAKO Satoshi Professor, Waseda University

AOKI Tamotsu Professor, National Graduate Institute for Studies

FUKAGAWA Yukiko Professor, University of Tokyo

FUNADA Hajime Member of the House of Representatives

GOMI, Norio Professor, Rikkyo University

HAKAMADA Shigeki Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University

HARUNA Mikio Deputy Chief Editorial Writer, Kyodo News

HIRANUMA Takeo Member of the House of Representatives

HIRONAKA Wakako Member of the House of Councilors

HIRONO Ryokichi Professor Emeritus, Seikei University

HONMA Masayoshi Professor, University of Tokyo

ICHIKAWA Isao Executive Advisor for Financial Affairs, Keio University

IGUCHI Yasushi Professor, Kwansei Gakuin University

INOUCHI Takashi Professor, University of Tokyo

IOKIBE Makoto Professor, Kobe University

ITO Motoshige Professor, University of Tokyo

ITO Takatoshi Professor, University of Tokyo

KAKIZAWA Koji Former Foreign Minister of Japan

KIKUCHI Tetsuro Chief Editorial Writer, Mainichi Newspaper

KIMURA Fukunari Professor, Keio University

KINOSHITA Toshihiko Visiting Professor, Waseda University

KOJIMA Tomoyuki Professor, Keio University

KURODA Haruhiko Special Advisor to the Cabinet of Japan

MANO Teruhiko Professor under special assignment, Keio University

MATAEBARA Yutaka Editor-In Chief & Managing Editor, The Japan Times

MORIMOTO Satoshi Professor, Takushoku University

NAGAOKA Noboru Editorial Writer, Asahi Shimbun

NAKASONE Yasuhiro Former Prime Minister of Japan

OE Shinobu Editorial Writer, The Yomiuri Shimbun

OKABE Naoki Editorial Page Editor, Nihon Keizai Shimbun

OKONOGI Masao Professor, Keio University

SAITO Tsutomu Senior and Editorial Writer, The Sankei Shimbun

SAKAKIBARA Eisuke Professor, Keio University

SHIMADA Haruo Professor, Keio University

SHINDO Eiichi Professor Emeritus, Tsukuba University

SHIOZAKI Yasuhisa Member of the House of Representatives

SHIRAIISHI Takashi Professor, Kyoto University

SOEYA Yoshihide Professor, Keio University

TAJIMA Takashi Secretary-General, Asian Productivity Organization

TAKAHARA Akio Professor, Rikkyo University

TAMURA Jiro Professor, Keio University

TANAKA Akihiko Professor, University of Tokyo

TANAKA Toshiro Professor, Keio University

URATA Shujiro Professor, Waseda University

WATANABE Toshio Professor, Takushoku University

YAMAKAGE Susumu Professor, University of Tokyo

YAMAZAKI Shinji Editorial Writer, Jiji Press

YAMAZAWA Ippei President, International University of Japan

YOSHIDA Haruki President, The Yoshida Labo for Economics and Industry, Inc.

Corporate Members (15 Members)

ARAKI Hiroshi Adviser, Tokyo Electric Power Co., Ltd.

CHO Fujio President, Toyota Motor Corp.

HATTORI Yasuo Vice Chairman, Seiko Epson Corp.

IMAI Takashi Honorary Chairman, Nippon Steel Corp.

INOUE Akiyoshi President, Sanyu Appraisal Corp.

ITO Yoshiro President, Itogumi Co., Ltd.

IWATANI Hideaki Executive Officer, Matsushita Electric Ind. Co., Ltd.

MAKIHARA Minoru Senior Corporate Advisor, Mitsubishi Corp.

MIYAHARA Kenji President & Chief Executive Officer, Sumitomo Corp.

MIYAUCHI Yoshihiko Chairman & CEO, Orix Corp.

NAKAMURA Kimikazu President, Sankyu Inc.

NARITA Yutaka Chairman & CEO, Dentsu Inc.

TATEISI Nobuo Executive Advisor, Omron Corp.

UESHIMA Shigeji Advisor, Mitsui & Co., Ltd.

YODA Tatsumi Honorary Chairman, Avex Inc.

YOSHIDA Haruki President, The Yoshida Labo for Economics and Industry, Inc.

Planning Committee

Chairman KAKIZAWA Koji Former Foreign Minister of Japan

Member YOSHIDA Haruki President, The Yoshida Labo for Economics and Industry, Inc.

Member JIMBO Ken Executive Secretary, The Council on Asian Community

Executive Secretary

JIMBO Ken Director of Research, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.

In Alphabetical Order

A Japanese Perspective of the Community Building in East Asia

(Text of the Dinner Speech by Ito Kenichi on August 16, 2004
at the 2nd NEAT Conference in Bangkok, Thailand)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my honor to be able to speak in this dinner meeting before the distinguished participants of the 2nd Annual Conference of the Network of East Asian Think-Tanks(NEAT). Taking advantage of this honorable occasion, I would like to address myself to you on the topic of "A Japanese Perspective of the Community Building in East Asia."

It is true that until recently we, Japanese, tended to be more passive, if not indifferent, to the concept of an East Asian community. Of course, it didn't mean that we, Japanese, failed to understand the importance of the regional cooperation in East Asia. On the contrary, Japan has always been one of the major promoters of the regional cooperation in East Asia. Suffice it to say that Japan was one of the countries that played a leading role in tackling with the 1997 financial crisis in East Asia, as demonstrated by her contribution to the successful role played by the Chian Mai Initiative in the resolution of the crisis. But still, we, Japanese, must be said to have been behind the move advocating community building in the region. This passiveness of Japan's attitude toward the concept of an East Asian community until the recent past might have been explained partly by her reluctance to take an initiative in anything that might be associated with the memory of "The Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" which was advocated by Japan during the Second World War.

Having said that, however, I can say that such was the case only until yesterday. Today, joining with you in the 2nd Conference of NEAT, we are more determined to go along with you in the direction of the creation of an East Asian community. In what were called "Issue Papers," which were presented by the Government of Japan to the ASEAN+3 Foreign Ministers Meeting held in Jakarta last month, it was stated that community building had now emerged as a shared future goal in East Asia. What has brought about the change of our attitude? Or, better to say, what has enlightened us? In my personal case, it was my experience to attend the 1st NEAT Conference held in Beijing last September. I saw there for the first time in my life Asians coming from different countries speaking in one voice and working for one purpose. I was touched by the aspiration of the people assembled in that NEAT conference.

After returning home from Beijing, we, those who attended the conference, called on our countrymen to organize an all-Japan intellectual platform where we can deepen our understanding of the concept of an East Asian community by way of conducting research and promoting policy debates among ourselves. Thus, "The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)" was inaugurated in Tokyo on May 18 this year. As of today, the membership of CEAC consists of representatives of 12 public policy think tanks and

15 business corporations in addition to 50 individuals who are mostly scholars but also include some journalists and politicians. In response to our call, 9 government ministries such as Foreign Ministry, Finance Ministry, Trade and Industry Ministry, Education and Science Ministry etc. also joined the activities of CEAC in their advisory capacity of Counselors. Actually, all the members of the current Japanese delegation to this 2nd Conference of NEAT are members of CEAC. One of the first topics which we discussed among ourselves was whether an East Asian community was really necessary and feasible. I am happy to report to you that the arguments we had were very positive and constructive.

Based on the results of such arguments within CEAC, but not in the name of CEAC as CEAC will not be ready to announce its unified view until any time soon yet, I would like to present to you today rather my personal view on the topic of "A Japanese Perspective of the Community Building in East Asia." After the end of the Cold War the trend of regionalism spread all over the world hand in hand with another trend of globalization. However, it was conspicuous until the recent past that two regions in the world were devoid of such regionalism. One was Middle East and another was East Asia. Whereas it was understandable that Middle East failed to have its regionalism because of the political, economic and cultural consequences of Arab-Israeli confrontation, the absence of regionalism in East Asia was never as much justifiable as in the case of Middle East. Certainly, it was true that this part of the world has been long characterized by the unique diversity in levels of economic development, traditional values, culture, ethnicity, religion, language, political regimes, etc. During the Cold War era political and ideological barriers hindered closer regional cooperation. But these excuses had to give way to the more powerful forces of integration which had brought about a gigantic change in the region, i.e. a drastic expansion of intra-regional exchanges and interdependence, particularly after the end of the Cold War. Today's East Asia is a center of vast economic potential and dynamism. Now, a third of the world population resides in this region. Its share of the global GDP accounts for one fifth, and countries in the region now hold about a half of the world foreign reserves. The 1997 financial crisis in East Asia awakened people of the region to the need of a regional approach to secure their prosperity. It is said that a friend in need is a friend indeed. Thanks to the crisis, we realized that our friends indeed were nobody but our neighbors in the region.

Let me now proceed to the question of how to build a regional community in East Asia. When I think about the history of regional integration in East Asia, I cannot help admiring the efforts made by ASEAN nations. In East Asia where many handicaps exist for regional integration, ASEAN has always played a leading role. It has hosted a number of key forums of regional cooperation, including ASEAN+1s, ASEAN+3, PMC and ARF. These forums have nurtured the basis of community building in East Asia. It is known to us all that the NEAT conference itself for which we meet here this evening was made possible under the framework designed by the ASEAN+3. In contrast to the European Union, where rule-making and institutionalization has been a driving force for integration, in East Asia the idea of community building was originally

inspired by the progress of various functional cooperation. To list just a few of them, we can mention Economic Partnership Agreements, Chiang Mai Initiative, Asian Bond Market Initiative, Asia Broadband Initiative, Mekong Region Development, and many other cooperation in the fields of terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, sea piracy, non-proliferation, energy security, environmental protection, food security, health, intellectual property, etc. I must say that this approach to the community building was better fit to the reality of East Asia as diversity was more salient here than in other regions. I am of the opinion that the functional approach is a natural choice for community building in East Asia.

Having said that, however, I have to hurriedly add that community building cannot be achieved by the mere promotion of the functional cooperation alone. If left alone at the mercy of either market forces or arbitrary diplomatic bargaining, it can drift and lose sense of direction. Here I would like to call your attention to the importance of the creation of a "sense of community" or a "shared identity as an East Asian." A European friend of mine once told me that he was then a German but that he would become a European once European integration had been achieved. He further added that then his German identity would not matter for him anymore. We, East Asians, are still at the stage of talking about "economic integration," or at best "economic community." Through the strengthening of our functional cooperation, we may be soon able to talk about "energy community," "environmental community" and many other types of "community" in the not so distant future. Here, however, we must be reminded that we need a beacon that guides us in the direction toward community building. Simple proliferation of functional cooperation alone is sure to lead us nowhere. Of course, it is true that the functional cooperation facilitates the so-called "enmeshment process," which is indispensable for forging a "sense of community" in East Asia. But "enmeshment process" as such alone again fails to provide us with a beacon that is to guide us in our direction toward community building. Some other people argue that to narrow the developmental gaps among countries in the region is the most important means for achieving a "shared identity as an East Asian." I agree with them. But let me add that narrowing the developmental gaps is one of the means to achieve an objective of a "shared identity". By nature, it fails to be a beacon that guides us to the objective of "shared identity." What then can be the beacon that can give us a sense of direction toward our goal of "community building"? What will take us in the direction toward the objective of a "sense of community" and a "shared identity as an East Asian"? In Europe it was their conviction that they will never turn Europe into a battlefield again that played the role of such a beacon in their process of integration.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We need something more powerful than a "common interest". Something beyond a "common interest" is needed. That is a "common value" to be shared by everybody in the region. It is my strong conviction that a "sense of respect" for each other and a "principle of equality" among each other are prerequisite for any meaningful "community building" in the region. This must be very clear to anybody if he or she is reminded that the opposite "sense" and "principle" are a "sense of superiority" and a

"principle of domination." Every nation, rich or poor, must be respected. No nation, big or small, is allowed to dominate. On the basis of this "sense of respect" and this "principle of equality," we can and should build confidence among ourselves. Our region must become a region where each of us can be confident that our neighbors will never resort to the threat or use of force as a means to settle international disputes. This is what is stipulated in Article 2, Section 4 of the Charter of the United Nations. Japan has its own Article 9 of the Constitution stating, "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." But, to tell the truth, what really matters is not a legal framework but a state of affairs as having been achieved. Look at, for instance, Europe, where community building has reached its highest level of development. Along the borders dividing any member countries of the European Union, we see no tanks, missiles, fortresses directed against each other. For many reasons other than legal, i.e. political, economic and other, the member countries of the European Union have come to a stage where it can be called a "no-war community." Let me now conclude my speech. We need a "common value" that goes beyond a "common interest". Starting from the "sense of respect" and the "principle of equality" among ourselves, we can and should build confidence among ourselves. The confidence that our neighbors will never resort to the threat or use of force as a means to settle international disputes would take us to the higher level of "community building." Here, what really matters is not a legal framework but a state of affairs as having been achieved. Our "community building" can start from "economic community," and add "energy community," "environmental community," etc. But it must, before reaching the final stage of an "East Asian Community," accomplish "no-war community" in the region.

Thank you very much for your kind attention.